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Abstract: 
In recent years, an overly narrow focus on rebound effects has limited the extent of researcher and 
policy attention afforded to the wider multiple benefits of increased energy efficiency. The objective 
of this paper is to focus policy attention on the sustained added value to the economy that is created 
as result of improving energy efficiency in the residential sector. Governments around the world are 
committed to increasing energy efficiency more generally, but often focus public support in low 
income households where energy poverty is a particular concern. However, governments operate in 
a context of multiple objectives where energy efficiency is expected to deliver significant reductions 
in carbon emissions alongside sustainable economic development. We use a UK CGE model to 
consider the general effects of supporting increases in energy efficiency in residential energy use. 
Our results demonstrate that the increase in GDP, and economic activity more generally, triggered 
by increased energy efficiency delivers more in terms of increased household incomes than the 
efficiency improvement itself.  We find that the more wide ranging the boost to energy efficiency, 
the greater the economic expansion and associated returns are likely to be, and the less the means 
of financing through public budgets will erode the benefits over time. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years the literature on the wider economic impacts of energy efficiency improvements has 
tended to focus on the issue of rebound effects. In particular, rebound studies have mainly focussed 
on measuring direct and indirect ( ‘ƌĞ-ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?) rebound effects using microeconomic or limited 
input-output economy-wide models (see for example Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Druckman, et al. 
2011;  Freire-Gonzáles, 2011). Where different household income groups are identified, emphasis 
has tended to be placed on how rebound effects that are driven by changes in real income following 
an energy efficiency improvement will be bigger the larger the share of total income that is spent on 
energy consumption (Chitnis et al., 2014; Murray 2013; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). 
However, certainly in colder climates like that of the UK, where lower income households tend to 
spend a larger share of their income on energy (Office for National Statistics, 2011, 2012, 2013), 
there are concerns over energy or fuel poverty (UK DECC, 2015).1 This both raises a challenge for the 
rebound-focussed literature, in that direct rebound effects triggered by lower energy costs may in 
fact be a true representation of required demand (to adequately heat properties), and focuses 
attention on the nature of socio-economic returns from increased energy efficiency.  
The latter point reflects the  ?ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨĞŶĞƌŐǇĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ proposed by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014). In particular the current paper focuses attention on the 
sustained added value to the economy that is created as result of investing in increased energy 
efficiency. We consider this in the context of a general equilibrium argument. That is, we propose 
that the increase in GDP and economic activity more generally that is triggered by increased energy 
efficiency (here in the household sector) delivers more in terms of energy poverty reduction than 
the efficiency improvement itself.2 This is through the additional return to household incomes as the 
economy expands. The larger and more wide-ranging the boost to household energy efficiency, the 
greater the economic expansion and associated returns are likely to be.  
We also consider a government funding argument, that public support should be directed at helping 
those less able to pay for energy efficiency improvements themselves. Specifically, we consider 
whether economic expansion triggered by more wide ranging support of energy efficiency 
programmes is likely to provide sufficient payback to justify greater levels of public support. This 
may also provide the basis for setting energy efficiency programmes in the context of a national 
infrastructure argument linked to improving the quality of a cŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƐƚŽĐŬ. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent indirect and 
economy-wide rebound literature that has been the recent setting for considering the impacts of 
increased efficiency in household energy use. We focus on the extent to which wider economic 
expansionary and socio-economic arguments have been made. Section 3 then focuses attention on 
the policy context for identifying the issues outlined above, expanding on the multiple benefits, 
general equilibrium and public funding/national infrastructure arguments. Section 4 describes the 
UK CGE model that we use to consider the general effects that may be anticipated if energy 
efficiency increases in one or more household income groups in an economy. Section 5 details the 
                                                          
1 In warmer climates, cooling may be a greater concern than heating. However, the expense of running air 
conditioning systems may deter low income households from investing in systems, so that expenditure on 
cooling does not manifest in economic statistics in the same way as energy poverty linked to heating.  
2 Note that in this paper we do not attempt to investigate impacts on precise measures of energy or fuel 
poverty currently adopted in the UK. At this stage, in our general analysis, we focus simply on whether the 
share of disposable income spent on energy goes up or down. 
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simulation scenarios that are then implemented in Section 6, where we discuss our results. Finally, 
Section 7 draws conclusions and considers policy implications. 
2. Existing literature on the wider impacts of energy efficiency  
In recent years a number of studies have analysed the impact of improved household energy 
efficiency using microeconomic demand systems, and input-output (IO) techniques. Their main focus 
has been the estimation of direct and indirect rebound effects (see for example Brännlund, et al. 
2007; Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Druckman et al., 2011; Freire-Gonzáles, 2011; Lenzen and Dey, 2002; 
Mizobuchi, 2008).   
More broadly, the main objective of this literature is to assess the effectiveness of energy efficiency, 
specifically in reducing energy use and CO2 emissions throughout the economy triggered by a 
reduction in final energy demand. For this reason, they estimate the rebound effect as a measure of 
the extent to which technically possible energy savings are eroded by economic responses.  
Some of these studies have estimated energy rebound effects by considering the impacts of energy 
efficiency and energy saving behavioural changes across different household income groups (Chitnis 
et al., 2014; Murray, 2013; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). In this context, a common finding is that the 
lowest income groups tend to be associated with higher rebound effects. This is for two reasons. 
First, lower income groups tend to spend a larger share of their income on energy. Second, the price 
elasticity of demand for energy goods is generally higher when income is lower, indicating that lower 
income households are more responsive to changes in energy price (Chitnis et al., 2014). When the 
price of energy in efficiency units decreases, price elastic groups respond by consuming more 
energy.  
However, a key limitation of the approaches adopted in the aforementioned studies is to rely on 
models that implicitly or explicitly adopt the assumption of fixed market prices and nominal 
incomes. Such models are not able to capture the full set of economic responses triggered by an 
energy efficiency improvement that will occur as the economy adjusts to a new steady state with 
different spending and production decisions. Thus, they are limited in their capability to identify 
other potential benefits of energy efficiency (Brännlund et al., 2007; Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Lecca 
et al., 2014). 
Duarte et al. (2015), and Lecca et al. (2014) have estimated the impact of improving energy 
efficiency in household energy use using more flexible computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
that incorporate IO data but permit the relaxation of the assumptions inherent in partial equilibrium 
and IO studies. Specifically, Lecca et al. (2014) takes the case of the UK and explores the value added 
of moving from a partial to a general equilibrium modelling framework (via an intermediate stage 
involving IO analysis) in the analysis of energy efficiency improvement. This is done by considering 
the impact of a 5% increase in household energy efficiency using models with different degrees of 
complexity calibrated on a common database.  
Lecca et al. (2014) initially estimate the direct rebound effect by estimating the elasticity of demand 
for energy goods and then derive the indirect (re-spending) rebound effects using IO techniques. 
They find that the indirect component of rebound is typically negative when the direct rebound is 
less than 100% and the economy is characterised by energy sectors that are relatively energy 
intensive. In their UK case study, households decrease their demand for energy and reallocate 
spending towards less energy intensive non-energy goods, thereby reducing both direct energy use 
and energy embodied in supply chains supporting consumption demand. These net negative indirect 
effects persist when Lecca et al. (2014) derive the full economy-wide rebound using a CGE model. 
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However, here the fuller economy-wide responses to the energy efficiency improvement are 
influenced by endogenous market price determination, nominal income and supply responses. This 
implies, for example, that the initial drop in demand for energy decreases the market price of energy 
in the short-run, exacerbating the rebound effect by amplifying the decrease in the price of energy 
services (for any given market price), which may be considered as the effective price of energy. 
However, it also negatively influences the revenue and capacity decisions of energy producing firms 
and, over time, their output prices (i.e. countering decreases in both the effective and market price 
of energy). Moreover, the increase in demand for non-energy goods puts upward pressure on 
domestic consumption prices, negatively influencing competitiveness of UK industries. Nonetheless, 
overall the Lecca et al. (2014) results show a net expansion in the UK economy, with an increase in 
investment, employment and household spending. However, with a fixed national labour supply, 
depending on how households respond to the change in cost of living given by increased energy 
efficiency, a sustained increase in wages may give rise to a higher price level and reduced export 
demand. 
The Lecca et al. (2014) contribution helps to clarify the importance of analysing the full general 
equilibrium impacts of increased household energy efficiency. However, it is limited in only 
considering one single representative household, thereby not permitting any differentiation among 
household income groups. However, differences in the composition of both incomes and 
expenditures are likely to be crucial in influencing the distribution of the effects of economic 
adjustment across household income groups. Here, heterogeneity of households proves to be very 
important from a policy perspective. 
Duarte et al. (2015) also use a CGE model, this time for Spain to assess a range of energy-saving 
policies including increasing energy efficiency, but identifying four household income groups. They 
actually find that lower income household are less responsive to an energy efficiency improvement, 
and indeed are associated with lower rebound effects.3 However, the main point is that, although 
the focus of the work is on potential reduction of CO2 emissions, ƵĂƌƚĞĞƚĂů ? ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? results also 
show that an energy efficiency improvement delivers an economic stimulus with a broader set of 
outcomes than reducing energy use.  
In general, though, much of the rebound literature neglects the wider range of potential economic 
benefits associated with increased energy efficiency that have been the focus of policy community 
contributions such as the IAE (2014) report. In response, this paper aims to add to the energy 
efficiency and CGE literature in filling this gap by exploring the wider impacts of household energy 
efficiency improvements in more detail, and to do so with specific focus on identifying different 
impacts among household income groups. In particular we focus on how support of energy 
efficiency programmes in the household sector may be justifiĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ƉĂǇďĂĐŬ ?ĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚďǇ
macroeconomic expansion. 
3. Broadening focus for a  ?ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?policy context  
If we broaden focus from estimating rebound effects of increased energy efficiency more carefully to 
consider the processes that drive them, we implicitly turn attention to what has become known as 
the multiple benefits argument. While this specific terminology originates with the IEA (2014), 
arguments and evidence that energy efficiency will enhance economic welfare in a range of ways, 
including as a result of macroeconomic expansion, have been considered in other studies, notably (in 
                                                          
3 This may relate to the issue of cooling vs. heating and that in warmer climates, such as Spain, low income 
households cannot afford more electricity-intensive systems such as air conditioning. 
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terms of reflecting on the recent dominant focus on rebound effects) in the recent contribution by 
Gillingham et al. (2016).4  
In the current paper, we build on previous CGE studies of increased household energy efficiency to 
consider the wider economic impacts that fall under the multiple benefits umbrella. In particular, we 
focus on a general equilibrium argument that economic expansion will potentially deliver more in 
terms of individual household economic well-being than the initial improvement in energy efficiency. 
That is, when the economy expands (through increased investment, employment and output) as a 
result of increased and reallocated real household spending, increased incomes from employment of 
labour and capital services will further boost household incomes.5 In an energy poverty context, 
while the expansionary process will trigger further rebound in household use (as well as in the 
production sector of the economy), this must be set against increased household incomes (and 
benefits).  
Thus, one implication of this general equilibrium argument is that support of energy efficiency will 
deliver on more than just the outcome of reducing energy use (and related carbon emissions). 
Rather, by stimulating economic expansionary processes, it will further boost incomes throughout 
the economy and potentially deliver a level of pay back that would justify the public support 
required to allow the efficiency improvement to occur. 
However, it may be argued that macroeconomic expansion can be delivered through other policies 
and that, where energy efficiency policy requires the support of the public purse, focus should be on 
helping those households who are currently unable to heat6 their homes sufficiently. While the 
general equilibrium argument above implies that that the more wide-ranging the energy efficiency 
improvement, the greater will be the benefit to all households, it is necessary to consider whether 
restrictions on the government budget may erode the multiple benefits. That is, a government 
funding argument must also be considered. In the UK analysis below, we consider the context of a 
government that requires to maintain a fixed public sector deficit so that any support for energy 
efficiency programmes must be of a balanced-budget nature. That is to say that the funding for such 
programmes must come either from a reallocation of existing public spending or a change in tax 
revenues, at least in the short-term (until the costs of introducing the efficiency improvement have 
been recovered).  
The key issue, then, is whether the resulting expansion is still large enough to compensate for the 
impacts of falling government expenditure (in the areas where spending is reduced) or the 
distortions triggered by increasing tax rates in part(s) of the economy. In turn, this is again likely to 
depend on how extensive the efficiency improvement is and what type and level of spending activity 
(the trigger for demand-led expansion) occurs as a result of freed up (and increased) household 
(real) disposable incomes. If the efficiency improvement is limited to low income households, it must 
be recognised that these households are (a) a more limited source of spending power, and (b) less 
sensitive to the wage and capital incomes generated by economic expansion, given their greater 
                                                          
4 Chan and Gillingham (2015) also provide an analytical exposition of how rebound effects will have positive 
economic welfare implications at the microeconomic level.  
5 As we show in the CGE simulations reported in Section 6, where there is any constraint on the supply-side of 
the economy (e.g. restricted national labour supply) a demand-led expansion will put upward pressure on 
prices and potentially damage competitiveness. While this may benefit household incomes through higher 
wage rates, any loss in competitiveness will limit the extent of economic expansion over time. Where the 
expansion is triggered by increased energy efficiency this may be mitigated if households reflect the change in 
their cost of living in wage demands. However, we do not explore this issue at this stage. 
6 Or, in the context of warmer climates, to cool. 
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dependence upon publicly funded benefits. Stimulating higher income households, on the other 
hand, may free up much more spending on non-energy goods and services and deliver greater 
benefits through increased wage and capital incomes.7   
This latter point may ultimately support a national infrastructure argument. If it can be shown that 
the economic stimulus generated by support of wider-ranging energy efficiency programmes is likely 
to deliver sufficient pay back to justify the initial levels of funding required, then arguments for 
strategic investment in energy efficiency can be more solidly made. On this basis, the type of quite 
generalised analysis we offer below is intended as a first step in impacting policy discussion around 
focussing attention on the broader value added/benefits of, for example, making buildings more 
energy efficient.    
4. Model and data 
We simulate the economy-wide and macroeconomic impacts of improving household energy 
efficiency using a variant of the UK CGE model UK-ENVI.8 For the specific application in this paper, 
we assume that investments are made by profit maximising forward-looking agents while (here five) 
representative households (distinguished as income quintile groups) are myopic. This intended to 
capture the notion that consumers ĚŽŶŽƚďĞŚĂǀĞ ?ĂƐŝĨ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂůůƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŵĞŶ ?ĂƐŝƐ
often assumed by economic modellers. In particular, households tend to be rather myopic, in 
contrast to firms, and base their spending decisions more on current income availability rather than 
on future discounted utility of consumption.9 In the following sections we provide a description of 
the main characteristics of the model.10 
4.1. Consumption  
We model the consumption decision of five representative households h as follows: ܥ௛ǡ௧ ൌ ܻܰܩ௛ǡ௧ െ ܵܣ ௛ܸǡ௧ െ ܪܶܣܺ௛ǡ௧ െ ܥܶܣܺ௛ǡ௧ 
 
(1) 
In (1) total consumption C is a function of income YNG, savings SAV, income taxes HTAX, and taxes 
on consumption CTAX. 
At each period in time, each household allocates its consumption between energy used for 
residential purposes, EC, and non-energy and transport goods and services (including fuel use in 
                                                          
7 Of course, in practice differences in propensities to consume and potential for further improvement in what 
may already be relatively energy efficient higher income homes (where efficiency in the use of luxury 
appliances may be a greater issue than heating/insulation) would have to be considered in any practical case 
study.  
8 UK-ENVI is a CGE modelling framework designed for the analysis of economic disturbances to the UK 
economy. The ENVI version is dedicated to the analysis of energy and environmental policies. 
9 It could be argued that lower income households are more myopic that higher income households. Although 
this is a reasonable observation, we decide to assume the same behaviour for all households given that a) we 
focus our attention on lower income households and b) long-run results are identical, regardless of the chosen 
dynamic. 
10 For fuller details on data, sectoral breakdown and detailed model description, see appendices to version of 
this paper at 
https://www.strath.ac.uk/media/1newwebsite/departmentsubject/economics/research/researchdiscussionpa
pers/16.16_-_complete.pdf 
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personal transportation), TNEC, according to the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function: 
ܥ௛ǡ௧ ൌ ቈߜ௛ா൫ߛܧܥ௛ǡ௧൯ఌ೓ିଵఌ೓ ൅ ൫ ? െ ߜ௛ா൯ܶܰܧܥ௛ǡ௧ఌ೓ିଵఌ೓ ቉ି ఌ೓ఌ೓ିଵ 
 
(2) 
In  ? ? ?ɸ is the elasticity of substitution in consumption, and measures the extent to which consumers 
substitute residential energy consumption, EC, for non-energy and transport consumption, TNEC, ɷࣅ 
(0,1) is the share parameter, and ɶis the efficiency parameter for residential energy consumption. 
For simplicity (and in the absence of better information), in all households we impose a value, 0.61, 
for ɸ that is the long-run elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy estimated by 
Lecca et al. (2014).11 The consumption of residential energy includes electricity, gas and coal, as 
shown in Figure 1, although the share of coal consumed by households represents less than 0.01% of 
total energy consumption. Within the energy bundle, given that we do not focus on inter-fuel 
substitution in the analysis below, we impose a small but positive elasticity.  
Figure 1. Consumption structure 
 
 
4.2. Production and investment 
The production structure is characterised by a capital, labour, energy and materials (KLEM) nested 
CES function. As we show in Figure 2, the combination of labour and capital forms value added, 
while energy and materials form intermediate inputs. In turn, the combination of intermediate and 
value added forms total output in each sector.  
Following Hayashi (1982), we derive the optimal time path of investment by maximising the value of 
firms ௧ܸ, subject to a capital accumulation function  ܭሶ௧, so that:  
                                                          
11 However, we have conducted sensitivity analysis where we introduce different values for different 
household income groups. In particular, we introduced higher values for lower household income groups and 
vice versa. In comparison to the results reported in Section 4, we find that a higher elasticity triggers a larger 
rebound effect overall and in the households with higher elasticity. While the impact on overall GDP is not 
much changed (slightly reduced in the short run), as may be expected, there is a larger boost to disposable 
income in those groups with a higher elasticity, while the share of income spent on energy falls by less. 
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ܯܽݔ ௧ܸ ෍ ൬  ? ? ൅ ݎ൰௧ஶ௧ୀ଴ ൣߨ௧ െ ܫ௧൫ ? ൅ ݃ሺݔ௧ሻ൯൧ݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐݐ݋ܭ௧ሶ ൌ ܫ௧ െ ߜܭ௧ 
 
(3) 
In (3), ߨ௧ ?ŝƐƚŚĞĨŝƌŵ ?ƐƉƌŽĨŝƚ ?ܫ௧, is private investment, ݃ሺݔ௧ሻ is the adjustment cost function with ݔ௧ ൌ ܫ௧ ܭ௧ ?  and ߜ is depreciation rate. The solution of the optimisation problem gives us the law of 
motion of the shadow price of capital, ߣ௧ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂĚũƵƐƚĞĚdŽďŝŶ ?ƐƋƚŝŵĞpath of investment 
(Hayashi, 1982). 
 
Figure 2. Production Structure 
 
4.3. The labour market 
Wages are determined within the UK in an imperfect competition setting, according to the following 
wage curve:  ൤ݓܾ௧ܿ݌݅௧൨ ൌ ߮ െ ߳ ሺݑ௧ሻ 
                                                                      where 
 
 
(4) ݓܾ௧ ൌ ݓ௧ ? ൅ ҧ߬௧   
 
where the real consumption (after tax) wage is negatively related to the rate of unemployment 
(Blanchflower and Oswald 2009).  In (4), 
௪௕೟௖௣௜೟ is the real take home wage, ߮ is a parameter calibrated 
to the steady state, ߳ is the elasticity of wage related to the level of unemploymentݑ௧, and ҧ߬௧ is the 
income tax rate. The working population is assumed to be fixed and exogenous.  
4.2. Government 
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The Government collects taxes and spends the revenue on a range of economic activities. We 
constrain the Government to maintain a constant budget balance. The aggregate fiscal deficit is 
taken to be fixed, so that any changes are constrained to be balanced budget in nature. The given 
fiscal deficit is maintained by either adjusting taxation or expenditure as illustrated in Equation (5): ܩܱܸܤܣܮ் ൌ ܩ ௧ܻ െ ܩܧܺ ்ܲ 
                                                        where 
 
(5) ܩ ௧ܻ ൌ ݀௚ܭ ௧ܻ ൅ ܫܤ ௧ܶ ൅ ҧ߬௧  ?ܮ ௧ܻ ൅ ܨܧതതതത௧  
 
 
In (5) GOVBAL is the government budget which is equal to the difference between government 
income GY, and government spending GEXP. GY is given by the share d_gof capital income  KY that is 
transferred to the Government, Indirect business taxes, IBT, revenues from labour income LY at the 
ƌĂƚĞʏ ?ĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƌĞŵŝƚƚĂŶĐĞ& ?/ŶƚŚĞďĂƐĞǇĞĂƌ'Ks>ŝƐŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐĂĨŝƐĐĂůĚĞĨŝĐŝƚƚŚĂƚ
we assume to be fixed in our present analysis. 
We initially assume that the Government absorbs the budgetary impacts of any change in the 
economy by adjusting expenditure and keeping household income tax rates fixed. However, as 
explained below, we explore other cases, including where the Government fixes its expenditure and 
adjusts the income tax rate. 
4.3. Dataset: income disaggregation and energy use 
We calibrate the UK-ENVI CGE model on the UK Social Accounting Matrix for 2010.12 The data has 30 
different productive sectors including 4 main energy supply industries that encompass the supply of 
coal, refined oil, gas and electricity. We identify UK households, the UK Government, imports, 
exports and transfers to and from the rest of the World (ROW). 
Table 1. Quintiles disaggregation in the 2010 UK SAM by weekly income 
HG1 HG2 HG4 HG4 HG5 
Up to £237 £238 - £412 £413 - £650 £651 - £1,014 £1,015 and over 
 
 
Table 2. Percentage of energy used for domestic purposes in total energy consumption and in total 
consumption 
 HG1 HG2 HG4 HG4 HG5 
Res. energy/  
Tot. energy 
 
89.6% 
 
85.2% 
 
81.4% 
 
76.2% 
 
69.9% 
Res. energy/ 
Tot. consumption 
 
6.7% 
 
5.5% 
 
4.5% 
 
3.8% 
 
2.6% 
 
                                                          
12 The SAM is produced by the Fraser of Allander Institute and available for download at: 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/business/economics/fraserofallanderinstitute/research/economicmodelling/ 
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As noted above, we disaggregate the household sector into 5 household income quintiles (HG), using 
the UK Living Costs and Food Survey. The income bands are described and related to weekly gross 
incomes in Table 1. 
Table 2 shows residential energy spending (on electricity, gas and coal) for each household as 
percentage of total energy consumption and of total consumption spending. 
As would be expected for a country with a colder climate like the UK, lower income household 
groups spend a greater share of their budget on energy. Moreover, the energy expenditure is mostly 
for residential (heating and lighting) use. As income increases, the share of energy in total 
expenditure decreases, and spending on fuels for transport increases. 
5. Simulation Scenarios 
As explained above (Section 3), the aim of the simulations in this paper is consider the general 
effects of delivering increased energy efficiency in different household income groups. For this 
reason, we focus on specifying and explaining simple and transparent scenarios, rather than 
attempting to detail and conduct simulations of particular policy options. We derive the impact of an 
illustrative 10% improvement in household residential energy use by exploring three main Scenarios. 
Each scenario is divided into two sub-scenarios: first, a, where we assume that the energy efficiency 
improvement occurs in all households, regardless of their income; then, b, where we assume that 
efficiency improves only in the energy use of the lowest income quintile household. From above, the 
latter case is identified as a priority focus for public spending where energy poverty is an issue of 
policy concern. 
In Scenario 1 we explore the impact of a 10% costless (and exogenously determined) improvement 
in household residential energy efficiency. This builds on the work of Lecca et al. (2014), extending 
that analysis to explore how the implications of the efficiency enhancement differ across the five 
income quintiles, and focussing only on energy used for heating and lighting (i.e. excluding refined 
fuel used in personal transportation).  
In Scenarios 2 and 3 we consider in broad terms different options for how Government may fund 
the increase in energy efficiency. Given that we do not have information about the likely cost of 
increasing household energy efficiency by 10% in UK, we simplify by assuming that the Government 
compensates for the difference in household energy expenditure before and after the efficiency 
increase, for a limited time period (5 years). This is done by including in the expenditure items of its 
own budget, as shown in Equation (6).  ܩܱܸܤܣܮ் ൌ ܩ ௧ܻ െ ܩܧܺ ்ܲ ൅  ?ܧܥ௧ 
 
(6) 
In order to keep the budget balanced when EC varies, the Government can either reduce its current 
expenditure, GEXP, or increase its income, GY. In the sixth period (year) after the efficiency 
improvement, we consider that it has been completely paid for and Equation (6) is replaced by its 
standard version described in (5).13  
                                                          
13 Again, we note that this is a simplifying assumption (and, unless the change in expenditure or tax is 
permanent, the number of periods assumed does not qualitatively impact our results below).  
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Following this approach, in Scenario 2 we assume that a 10% household energy efficiency 
enhancement is funded via a temporary reallocation of Government spending. This effectively 
means that for five years the Government has to decrease its expenditure on other goods and 
services in order to spend on energy efficiency, while ensuring that the government balance is 
maintained in each period.  
In Scenario 3 we assume that a 10% household energy efficiency improvement is funded through a 
temporary rise in income tax. This implies that the Government is able to hold its current spending 
constant while balancing the budget through additional revenue. The focus on income tax is 
motivated in terms of the energy efficiency improvement being beneficial to households so that 
paying through tax provides an indirect way of having the household sector as a whole pay for 
increased efficiency in dwellings. However, there are distributional implications because higher 
income households pay more tax. Moreover, where only the lowest income household benefits from 
the energy efficiency improvement, the implication is that this is largely paid for by other 
households. In terms of the impacts on any economic expansion, introducing a change in income tax 
has important implications. This is because it triggers a change in supply side behaviour through the 
wage bargaining process, given that the after-tax or take-home wage, which is the focus of the 
bargaining process, is directly impacted. 
6. Results 
6.1. Costless improvement in household energy efficiency 
Table 3 shows the short and long-run impacts on key macroeconomic and energy use variables of a 
costless 10% increase in UK household energy efficiency for the two sub-scenarios: a. where the 
energy efficiency improvement occurs in all households (All HG); b. where efficiency improves only 
in the energy use of the lowest income quintile households (HG1).  
We report the results as percentage changes from the base year (SAM 2010) values, with the short-
run results referring to the first period (year) after the energy efficiency improvement takes place 
and the long-run referring to a conceptual time period where the capital stock is fully adjusted to a 
new steady-state equilibrium. Remember from Section 4 that we assume a fixed national labour 
supply, with a pool of unemployed labour and wage bargaining where there is a negative 
relationship between the unemployment rate and real after tax wage. 
Beginning with Scenario 1a, where all UK households increase efficiency in residential energy, the 
first column in Table 3 shows that in the short run the switch in household expenditure away from 
spending on energy for heating and lighting towards other types of consumption has a small 
expansionary impact on the economy. Total GDP, consumption (disposable income after savings), 
employment, and investment increase by 0.03%, 0.52%, 0.05% and 1.14% respectively.  As the 
sectors involved (directly or indirectly) in supplying goods and services where demand has increased 
expand (off-set by contractions in energy supply chains), there is a corresponding stimulus to labour 
demand. This causes the unemployment rate to decrease by 0.82% while the nominal wage 
increases by 0.42%, which, with a CPI increase of 0.32%, equates to the 0.09% increase in the real 
wage. However, the increase in the CPI does lead to a decrease in total export demand of 0.49% 
while imports increase by 0.7%. 
Total household residential energy consumption falls by 2.35%, which, taking into account how a full 
range of economy-wide adjustments impact household income and consumption, is a large (76.5%) 
rebound on the 10% potential energy savings. That total household energy rebound is higher reflects 
increased spending on refined fuels for personal transportation. However, that the full economy-
12 
 
wide rebound is proportionately smaller (just under 69.9%) reflects that there is a net decrease in 
energy use on the production side of the economy (due to the contraction in energy supply activity).  
The long-run results for Scenario 1a, reported in the second column in Table 3, show household 
energy use remaining below its base-year value. That rebound effects are smaller in the long-run 
than in the short-ƌƵŶƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ ‘ĚŝƐŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?dƵƌŶĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?  ŽƌĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?
in energy supply on energy prices and consumption and production choices. There is a further (less 
energy-intensive) expansion in GDP, with a long run increase of 0.16%. The expansion in the long run 
is greater than in the short run because the ability for all production sectors to adjust capacity allows 
a greater response to the net positive demand stimulus from increase real household income 
reallocated to other goods and services. However, given that the total labour force is assumed to be 
fixed, there is a fall in the unemployment rate generating an increase in the real wage. This, in turn, 
puts continued (but declining) upward pressure on all commodity prices and reduces 
competitiveness so that there is a lasting decrease in export demand (-0.37%).   
 
Table 3. % change in key macrocosmic variables from a 10% costless increase in household residential 
energy efficiency 
 
Scenario 1a  Scenario 1b  
 SR LR SR LR 
GDP 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.02 
CPI 0.32 0.21 0.03 0.01 
Investment 1.14 0.79 0.15 0.11 
Unemployment rate -0.82 -2.08 0.04 -0.13 
Employment 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.01 
Nominal wage 0.42 0.45 0.02 0.03 
Import 0.70 0.58 0.07 0.05 
Export -0.49 -0.37 -0.04 -0.02 
Total energy use -0.67 -0.89 -0.09 -0.11 
Disposable income (excluding savings) 0.52 0.58 0.06 0.07 
Household total energy consumption -1.66 -1.87 -0.22 -0.24 
Residential energy consumption -2.35 -2.62 -0.30 -0.33 
Household rebound in res. energy 76.53 73.82 79.03 76.71 
Household rebound in total energy 78.89 76.33 80.65 78.50 
Economy wide rebound 69.86 59.68 71.94 63.91 
 
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 show the corresponding results if we limit the increase in 
energy efficiency to the lowest income quintile, Household Group 1 (HG1). The long-run results are 
qualitatively the same as found in Scenario 1a, but the scale of both the economic expansion and the 
contraction in total household energy use is much smaller. In the short-run, crowding out effects 
impacting exports and disinvestment in the energy supply sectors actually causes a very small net 
negative impact in GDP (-0.001%).14 The core issue is that the lowest income quintile, where 
spending power is directly boosted by the energy efficiency improvement, is only a very small source 
                                                          
14 However, sensitivity analysis shows that if the proportionate increase in energy efficiency is larger, here 
14%, this is sufficient to make the short-run increase in GDP slightly positive (0.003%, but with the long-run 
impact, although very slightly larger, remaining the same to the two decimal places in Table 3). 
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of consumption expenditure in the UK economy. This group is also not a huge beneficiary of 
increased labour and capital income when the expansion occurs. This means that further induced 
 ‘ŵƵůƚŝƉůŝĞƌ ?ƌŽƵŶĚƐŽĨƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐĐŽŵĞůĂƌŐĞůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚŝŶĐŽŵĞŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝƐ
limited in the very small expansion reported.15  
                                                          
15 We have run alternative simulations where the other income quintiles are in turn each the recipients of the 
energy efficiency increase. In all other cases the positive stimulus from their boosted and reallocated spending 
is sufficient to generate a positive expansion from the outset.    
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Table 4. % change in household income and energy expenditure in Scenarios 1a and b 
  
 HG1 HG2 HG3 HG4 HG5 
  SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
          Scenario 1a         
Disposable income 
(excluding savings) 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.63 0.54 0.60 0.51 0.60 0.43 0.52 
Residential energy 
consumption -1.99 -2.31 -2.19 -2.49 -2.34 -2.61 -2.44 -2.68 -2.61 -2.86 
Share of  income spent 
on res. energy -2.67 -2.99 -2.78 -3.10 -2.87 -3.19 -2.93 -3.26 -3.03 -3.36 
Household rebound in 
residential energy  80.11 76.85 78.07 75.08 76.59 73.87 75.61 73.24 73.90 71.43 
                      
  HG1 HG2 HG3 HG4 HG5 
  SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
          Scenario 1b         
Disposable income 
(excluding savings) 0.60 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Residential energy 
consumption -2.41 -2.45 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 
Share of  income spent 
on res. energy -3.00 -3.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Household rebound in 
residential energy  75.86 75.47 - - - - - - - - 
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Indeed if we refer to the long-run results for the change in household disposable income net of 
savings (i.e. consumption spending) in Tables 4a and 4b, note that around 85% of the increase 
enjoyed by HG1 when energy efficiency improves in all households is retained in the case where only 
HG1 Increases its efficiency. On the other hand, comparison of the GDP results in the second and 
fourth columns of Table 3 show that the long-run GDP increase under Scenario 1b is only around 
10% of what is realised when all households improve their energy efficiency.  
Comparison of the results in scenarios 1a and 1b reported in Table 4 show that residential energy 
use in the lowest household income group falls most, as does the share of consumption spending on 
this energy use, when the efficiency improvement is targeted only in HG1. This is because the 
rebound in energy use is smaller where there is a more limited boost to household income. 
However, Table 3 has shown that the total reduction in UK households and economy-wide energy 
use is smaller (i.e. rebound is larger) under Scenario 1b when the efficiency improvement is limited 
to HG1. This is because the other households do not experience an improvement in efficiency and 
slightly increase their energy consumption with the (very limited) economic expansion.   
The conclusion that can be drawn is that more extensive energy efficiency stimuli can deliver a fuller 
set of desired outcomes. This includes achieving reductions in energy use through energy efficiency 
and (by implication from reduced energy use) carbon reduction targets, boosting household income 
in low (and other) income households, along with wider economic expansion. However, so far we 
have not given any consideration to how increased energy efficiency may be funded. Therefore, in 
the next section, we report on extended simulations where we incorporate a basic consideration of 
the impacts of applying some treatment of cost via the public budget.  
6.2. Basic options for funding improvements in household energy efficiency via the Government 
budget 
First, let us consider the case of effecting some payment for the introduction of the energy efficiency 
improvement through a temporary reallocation of government expenditure, in the manner detailed 
above in Section 5 (Scenarios 2a and 2b).16 The main impact of the required reduction in 
Government spending in other areas of the economy is a short run contraction in economic activity 
(reflected in the GDP results over time in Figure 3). The contraction in activity actually continues for 
less than the assumed 5-year period of required reallocation of government expenditure. This is 
because firms are forward looking (i.e. they know that the contraction in spending will end) and they 
adjust their investment plans accordingly.  
At the level of the different household income groups, in Scenario 2a, where all households improve 
their energy efficiency, the short-run impact is a slightly smaller boost to consumption (disposable 
income net of savings) but with the gap relative to the  ‘no cost ? Scenario 1a being larger in higher 
income groups where labour and capital incomes are more important. In Scenario 2b, where energy 
efficiency only increases in the lowest income quintile, the impact for HG1 remains more or less 
unchanged relative to Scenario 1b. However, all other groups now experience a slight contraction in 
their income used for consumption (-0-01% in HG2&3 and -0.02% in HG4&5).  
The key finding, however, is that the long-run results under Scenarios 2a and 2b are unchanged 
relative to the costless case in Scenarios 1a and 1b. 
 
                                                          
16 The long run results under Scenarios 2 and 3 are generally not very different to what is observed in Scenario 
1 so we do not provide equivalent tables, instead focussing on key results in the figures below. 
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Figure 3: Period by period % change in GDP from a 10% increase in residential energy efficiency in 
all households. 
 
On the other hand, when we consider the case of a temporary increase in the income tax rate 
(Scenarios 3a and 3b) there are more marked changes in the nature of the results. First, as noted in 
Section 5, the change in income tax brings about a change in the supply side of the economy. This is 
because the increase in taxation reduces the take home wage, causing workers to demand higher 
salaries, putting upward pressure on the real wage and thereby impacting costs faced by all firms. 
While Figure 3 shows a very close convergence in long-run GDP under Scenario 3a, there are some 
minor differences in the long-run impacts on GDP, investment and employment/unemployment.    
Figure 4: Period by period % change in GDP from a 10% increase in residential energy efficiency in 
household quintile 1. 
 
However, there is a greater impact on results when the energy efficiency improvement is limited to 
HG1 in Scenario 3b. First, Figure 4 shows that there is a small contraction in GDP that lasts into the 
long run (-0.005%). This implies that the increase in energy efficiency in HG1 does not provide a 
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sufficient economic stimulus to demand to deliver a long-run expansion in the presence of the 
adverse supply-side shock that is delivered via the induced rise in wage demands.17  
Moreover, while the impact on income used for consumption is very similar in Scenario 3b (as 
compared to 3a) under the government spending and tax options for HG1 (only slightly worse under 
the latter), it is very different for all the other household income groups. Initially, given that they pay 
more income tax, HG2-5, effectively pay for the increase in HG1 energy efficiency through their 
increased tax contributions. However, over time, even once the tax rate returns to its original level, 
the other groups continue to pay through the greater impact on their disposable (net of savings) 
incomes from the economic contraction. This is shown in Figure 5.  EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚ ‘ůŽƐĞƌ ?ŝƐ
the highest income quintile, HG5. This is due to the fact that income from ownership of capital (most 
important in HG5) is adversely affected in this scenario due to more limited investment activity. 
We have run a specific sensitivity scenario where we increase the size of the energy efficiency 
improvement in HG1 to see what is required to produce a positive GDP result over the long-run 
under the income tax funding scenario. We find that a 12% boost to the residential energy use in 
HG1 is sufficient to deliver a net positive (0.0003%) increase in GDP over the long run, with the 
positive result emerging from period 11. However, the net negative impact on disposable income in 
the other household groups persists, albeit to a lesser extent. We find that, where we have an 
income tax funding arrangement as above, a doubling of the efficiency improvement in HG1 
residential energy use to 20% is required to remove the long-run negative impacts on the disposable 
income of all other groups. Below this, the highest income household remains most affected, for 
example with only HG5 losing out over the long run where the efficiency improvement in HG1 is 
19%.     
Figure 5: Short-run and long-run % change in disposable income from a 10% increase in residential 
energy efficiency in household quintile 1 funded via an increase in income tax. 
 
                                                          
17 However, again, we find that if any other household group is the sole beneficiary of the energy efficiency 
improvement, the resulting stimulus is sufficient to deliver a net expansion in GDP, and that this is more so the 
higher the income level of the group in question.  
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Overall, the results above suggest that imposing a cost for increasing energy efficiency via the public 
ďƵĚŐĞƚǁŝůůĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?ŽĨŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĞŶĞƌŐǇĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĂƚůĞĂƐƚŝŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƌƚĞƌƌƵŶ ?
However, if the economic expansion is sufficiently big, the long-run outcome is one of net gain in 
broader economic impacts. When the efficiency improvement is targeted only in the lowest income 
households this does deliver the desired outcomes for that group, but it weakens the economic 
expansion, while the need for (and nature of) public funding through the government budget 
becomes much more important. 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
Many recent economic modelling studies of increased energy efficiency have tended to focus on the 
issue of rebound effects. However, in considering economy-wide rebound in particular, some studies 
have identified economic expansion resulting from increased energy efficiency as the driver of 
ƌĞďŽƵŶĚ ?ĂĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨ ‘DƵůƚŝƉůĞĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
IEA (2014). Here, we have focused our attention on how the economic expansion may provide a 
justification for public/government support of energy efficiency programmes.  
Specifically, we have used an illustrative CGE modelling analysis for the UK to consider the general 
effects of government support of domestic energy efficiency programmes. We have raised the 
question of whether only low income households should be aided in improving their energy 
efficiency, or whether there is sufficient return through expansion to justify potentially supporting 
wider ranging programmes. A key point that we have raised is that many governments are 
committed to the support of energy efficiency programmes but may focus this in low income 
households. However, Governments tend to have a wider set of desired outcomes, including 
reduced energy use and carbon emissions, but also in terms of reducing poverty (including but not 
limited to energy poverty) and increasing economic well-being, in part through GDP and 
employment growth.   
In considering scenarios where support is provided only for the lowest income households to 
increase their energy efficiency, our findings suggest that it is likely to be difficult to meet all of 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛobjectives simultaneously through limited support of households that are significantly 
less connected to the wider economy than others (in terms of their level of spending and their 
sources of income). Our own results suggest that in order to stimulate economic activity by this 
route quite large proportionate increases in residential energy efficiency in low income household 
need to be achieved.  In contrast, where the introduction of increased energy efficiency is spread 
over all (or at least a wider range) of households, even where there is a cost to supporting energy 
efficiency improvements, the return via the impacts of economic expansion is likely to provide what 
justification for support.  
However, our findings suggest that the means of providing support for energy efficiency 
programmes should be carefully considered and examined. Our results imply that a reallocation of 
government spending will be less distortive than requiring the household sector to pay indirectly 
(according to ability to pay) via income tax. However, we reserve fuller consideration of specific 
funding mechanisms for future research, ideally in consultation with policy decision makers 
particularly within the UK.  
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